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I. Introduction 
The importance of the natural environment has long been recognized 
by econonists. Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage is implicitly 
a theory about location-specific natural attributes. Although Ricardo 
does not dwell on the climatic differences between England and Portugal, 
it is these uifferences which make wine relatively inexpensive to produce 
in Portugal. Thus, environnental differences, along \o:ith technological 
differences, play a key role in much of international trade theory. 
Hore recent work has emphasized the fact that consumers may have 
preferences about the environment. This line of work has stressed the 
nobility of workers to take advantage of more pleasant locations within 
a country. This research has shown that both wages and rents must adjust 
to clear tne labor and land markets. 
The observation that nature is important can generate many 
insi~hts. If climate influences production, this can explain why some 
areas specialize in certain goods. If reople have preferences about climate, 
this can explain why some regions ;1ave lower wages or higher rents than 
ot;,ers. The distribution of location-specific attributes r.1ay also provide 
insir;ht into the distribution of the population. 
As i1:1portant as this line of thinking is for understanding a modern 
economy, it is even more valuable in understanding an under-developed country. 
The natural environment is more important in LDC's because these countries 
lack the physical capital to cope effectively with their environment. 
Differences in rainfall, temperature an<l terrain may dominate agricultural 
output in a country with scant technological knowledge and even less 
physical capital with which to implenent that knowledge. Differences in 
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climate are more important to consumers if the available housing provides 
little real shelter against the elements. The migration of peoples 
and consequent redistribution of the population may be the cheapest means 
of coping with the environment in these societies. 
Despite the·obvious relevance of location specific traits, development 
economists have paid them surprisingly litt!e attention. Instead, wage 
differences within a country have been regarded as evirlence of market 
failure. Wage differences enforced by minimum wage laws or other 
government interventions certainly do represent an ir.iperfection in the 
market. The policy prescription, however, is to remove the intervention, 
rather than to assur.ie the governmental restriction as given. If the 
wage differentials exist even in the absence of goven1ment intervention, 
this is not prir.ia ~ evidence of market failure. Differences in 
naturally occurring amenities or productivity enhancing traits could 
support these wage differentials. 
Policy makers in LDC's also tend to view migration with alann. 
The large scale movements of people are considered "dislocations" or 
The ui,:,,J nff.,.,...,,1 hP-r<> i~ th:,it mio-r,:itinn-- ---- ---o-----·· is 
part of the process of adapting to circumstances. Migration offers 
people an opportunity to better thenselves individually. The process of 
relocating people from unproductive or unpleasant areas to more desirable 
places also offers society ·an inexpensive method of increasing real living 
standards. 
The theory presented in this paper is generally applicable, both 
to developed countries and to LDC's. The model is an extension of previous 
efforts in location theory. 
One limitation of past work is that the consumers have been assumed 
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to be homogeneous in tastes and skills. If workers in an economy have 
two levels of skill, how will the population of these two groups be 
distributed with respect to the location specific traits? If the workers 
have different preferences for climate or environment, how will these 
preferences be reflected in the wages and rents? This paper attempts to 
answer these questions. 
The relative population distribution is especially important for 
policy. in developing countries. Concentrations of certain types of people 
in particular areas is not necessarily cause for concern. What appears 
to be a lopsided distribution of groups of people may in fact be the 
natural outcome of market forces. These market forces, namely, nature, 
personal preferences and comparative advantages, are not forces which can 
be dissolved at the stroke of an administrative pen. Nor would it be 
desirable to eliminate these factors, even if it were possible. The theory 
presented here is designed to illustrate the economic effects of these 
forces. 
II. Tne Structure of the Model 
Imagine a cotmtry with some natural feature, n, which varies across 
the country. Without loss of generality, define the units of n so that it 
is a continuous variable over the interval [O, l]. We will focus on the 
production of a cor.rnosite commodity, X, whose price will be taken as 
numeraire. The country is a small country, so that the price of the 
numeraire good is given by world trade. 
The production function is constant returns to scale and requires 
inputs of land and of two types of labor. The two types can be thought 
of as skilled and unskilled, labor and management or simply two distinct 
trades. There is no necessary P+,esumption that one type of labor is more 
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skilled than the other. The only crucial features are that the two types 
of labor are not perfect substitutes in production and that both types are 
needed for production. The unit cost function associated with this 
* production function can be written as C(v, w , r, n), where w is the wage 
of the "unsl~illed" worKer, w * the wage of the "skilled" and r the rent on 
1
land. 
The zero profit condition for the fim is that costs in all locations 
be equal to the world prices, 
*(1) C(w, w , r, n) = 1 
Otherwise, sorr1e firms would have an incentive to relocate. Costs may vary 
across locations because factor prices may vary. The natural attribute 
affects costs directly by shifting the marginal productivity of each of 
the factors. 
Also, n enters the utility functions of the two types of workers, 
The workers consume the composite cOtIII!lodity, x, the quantity of natural 
amenity in the area where they live and work, and some residual land, 1, 
in the same area. The problem for the worker is in tw" steps: first. 
to choose the consumption bundle that maximizes his utility subject to 
his budget constraint in each location and second, to choose the optimal 
2 
location. The indirect utility function associated with this problem is: 
V(w, r, n), where w is the wage and r is the price of land. 
The location ~qu:UH !'ium of the workers requires that the indirect 
utility function be equal at all locations. If this were not true, some 
workers would have an incentive to move to areas where they could enjoy 
higher utility. This equilibrium condition is: 
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(2) V(w, r, n) = k J 
An analogous condition can be written for the skilled workers: 
(3) V*(,1* , r, n) = k * 
The two types of workers have different utility functions and different 
wages. 
The three equations (1)-(3) contain three unkno\-ms, w, w* and r, 
and so can be solved in tenns of the parameters. Note that the same 
price of land, r, appears in all three equations. The owners of land 
wa.,t to rent to the highest bidder; they do not care whether the bidder is 
a skilled worker, an unskilled worker or a business establishment. In 
this sense, land is "mobile" between various uses although obviously 
immobile across physical locations. 
A. Factor Price Gradients 
The interesting probleM is how the factor prices are affected by 
the naturally occurring amenity. To answer this question, totally differentiate 
equations (1)-(3) and express in log:iritrunic terms: 
A A 
+ e r + nn = 0 r 
A ,. 
(2') H - k r + kn = 0 
R. n 
"* *" *"' (3') w - k 'I'." kn = 0 0 + n 
where 8i = C.i, or the share of factor price i in total cost, k. c !! and 
1 R, W 
** _ rt1-: - -*- , or the budget share of land in each type worker's budget, and 
R. w 
dx 
X = or the percentage change in the variable x. These relations can be found 
X 
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by using the fact that Ci is the quantity of the factor whose price is 
i needed per unit of output and Roy's identity or V /V .. - 1. r w 
n V 
The variable kn is defined as w / Vn • V /V can be thoughtn w 
w 
of as the fo.plicit price of n. If n is an amenity, k is positive. Thus n 
k is the implicit budget share of n in the consumers budget. The chanie n 
~n unit costs due to a percentage change in the natural attribute is defined 
as n. Specifically, n is the share weighted sum of the effect of n 
nC. 
l.n •on the productivity of each factor. n = 8wn + 8* n * + 8 n, where ni =-w w w r r Ci 
If the attribute enhances productivity, its presence reduces unit costs 
and n < 0 • 
B. Equilibrium 
The equilibrium wage and rent gradients can be found by solving 
A"" "" 
simultaneously for w, w ""* and r in terms of n, the percentage change in 
the natural attribute. The result is equations (4) 
"" 
w 1 * * (4) - = - { - k (6 + e k ) + k (k * e * - n) }"" 
A n r w 9., n wtn Ll 
""* w 1 
=- { - k* <e + 8 k ) + k * R. (k e - n) }"" n r w R. n wn !>. 
A ""* The discussion will focus on thew equation, since thew equation is exactly 
analogous. 
The first of the two terms in each of the wage equations captures 
-7-
the effect of consumer preferences on wages. If the "unskilled" workers 
regard n as an amenity (k > O), then the first term in the unskilled n 
wage equation is negative. This is exactly the result that Adam Snith 
would have predicted ,-1hen he noticed that the executioner had to be paid 
a hi~her wage for his unpleasant job: wages and job-related amenities 
are negatively related. 
The second term of the equation depends on the preferences of the 
other type of worker and on the productivity characteristics of the natural 
attribute. If the "skilled" workers enjoy the amenity this tends to 
raise the wages of the "unskilled". If the attribute increases productivity, 
wages tend to rise. 
The explanation of these two effects can be readily seen with the 
aid of Figure 1. The downward sloping lines show combinations of w and r 
will hold costs constant, given the location specific attribute and the 
,-: 
wages of the other type of labor. Any change in n or w which lowers the 
costs of production will shift the factor price frontier outward. For 
example, if n increases productivity, the equality of costs with world 
price requires that the wage and the rent increase. The upward sloping 
lines represent the "unskilled" workers' indirect utility function given 
n. The indifference curves slope upward because workers require higher 
,.ages to compensate them for higher rents, other things equal. An increase 
inn shifts the indifference curve up and to the left because a combination 
of higher rents and lower wages are required to equalize utility in all 
locations. 
Point A in Figure 1 represents a combination of wages and rents in 
a region with n of the natural attribute. We want to know how this wage1 
compares with the wage in an area with a greater quantity, n , under various2 
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circumstances. The first case is that n is amenable to the unskilled 
workers, but not to the others and n has no effect on productivity. Point 
B represents this case: the wages are unambiguously lower than at Point 
A. This captures the effect of the first term in equation (4). 
The second case is that n is amenable to neither group, but it enhances 
productivity. Point D represents this case; the wages are higher to offset the cost 
saving afforded by n. This captures the effect of n in equation (4). 
The third case is that n is amenable to the skilled workers only 
and has no productivity effects. This situation is exactly like the case 
where n is productive. If the skilled workers value n, their wages will 
tend to be lower. Their lower wages reduces unit costs of production, just 
as a productivity enhancing attribute does. This shifts the cost curve 
up and to the right, the same way a productive shift inn would. Thus, 
the point D again is representative of the type of change in factor prices 
we mi~ht observe if the other workers value the natural attribute. 
These second and third cases correspond to the tems in the second 
set of parentheses in the wage equation. If n increases productivity, 
(n < O) the wage rises. If the skilled workers enjoy n, (k > O), the 
n 
wages of the unskilled rise. These two effects offset the negative effect 
of the attribute on wages which comes about because the workers value n. 
Point C in Figure 1 illustrates these offsetting effects. Both the indifference 
curve and the cost curve have been shifted by n and the net effect on wages 
is ambiguous. 
Because of the interaction between the wages of the two types 
of workers, the reader may wonder how n affects the relative wage of the 
workers. The relative wage is easily found and is shown in equation (5). 
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'"'* ... k k 
w w 1 n n (5) { - 8 (k* - k ) - (1 - 8 ) k kn* (-;--)-... - -,,.. = - r n n r 1 14, 
n n kg_· kt 
Not surprisingly, the type with the lower relative preference for n and 
the higher relative preference for land will have their wages redu"ced by 
3 
a greater amount. 
This exercise also produces the rent gradient. 
r 1 * * (6) -;:=- {ke+ke-n } n w n w n t:, 
Rents are higher in high n locations if either type of worker values n. 
(Sec points :a and D in Figure 1). If the national attribute enhances 
productivity, this fact also increases rents. 
Having solved for the rent gradient, the "real wage" gradient can 
be foun<l. 
... ,,.. 
w r 1 
-;:--T=-
n n 
The real wage is negative as long as the attribute enhances productivity or 
doesn't dininish productivity greatly. The amenity effects of the natural 
attribute are unambiguously negative. This is not surprising since the 
wages and rents must adjust to the climate to keep utility constant in all 
locations. Measuring the real wage as the change in wages minus the change 
in rents will produce a lower real wage in high amenity locations because 
the reduction in disposable income is the implicit payment for the location 
specific amenity. This result has been found in other work in location theory. 
Thus, regional wage differences may be supported by climate. Even 
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regional differences in wage deflated by the cost of living may persist 
in markets where location specific attributes are valued either by 
workers or by firms. This result holds in ~odels with non-traded goods 
and in models with only one type of worker as well. (See Roback.) The contri­
butions of the present model are: 1) we can understand the interaction of 
the two types of workers on each others' wages and 2) we can study the 
relative distribution of populations. 
C. The Population Distribution 
The distribution of different types of people across a country 
is a natter of great concern to policy ~akers and we tum now to this 
concern. Pe will confine our attention to the change in population that 
results from a change in climate, rather than focusing on problems of 
population size per se. 
The population gradients can be found by using the market clearing 
conditions for land and the two types of labor. Market clearing conditions 
were conspicuous by their adsence in the previous section. Separating the 
prol>lem in to the set of the cost function and the equal utility equations 
for the factor price gradients and the set of market clearing equations 
for the population gradients is the key analytical feature of this model 
which renders it tractable. 
The labor market clearin:;4 conditions in each location follow very 
straigiitforwardly from the production function. C is the demand for labor w 
per unit of output. Therefore, total demand at iocation n is X(n) C (n),w 
where X(n) is the total output at location n. Labor market clearing requires 
that: 
(8) C (u)X(n) = h 
w 
C*(n)X(n) = h* 
w 
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Land market clearing requires that all the land be used, for 
residences of the two types of workers, or for production. The denand 
for land in production is C (n)X(n): C (n) per unit of output, times 
r r 
total output, X(n). The land market clearing condition is: 
* * (9) L(n) = h(n) 1(n) + h (n; i (n) + C (n)X(n)r 
where l,.(n) is the total land available with a given araount of the characteristic 
n. 
Examining equations (8) and (9) reveals that a solution to the problem is possi­
ble in principle. L(n) is given by nature and is a fundamental parameter of 
the problem. The worker der.iand equations from the preceeding section imply 
* solutions for i (n) and i (n). Similarly, C {n) is detennined by the productionr 
demand equation. Thus, we c1re left with three unknowns, h(n), h*(n) an<l 
X(n) in these three equations. 
The simplest solution method is to express (9) in tenns of h(n). 
* * Tn do this substitute h/C for X (fr0r:1 equation (8)), and hC /C for h w w w 
(also from equation (8)). The result is equation (9'): 
(9 I) L(n) = -(h C .2. + C * .t * + C )C w w r 
w 
We can now easily find the expression for the population gradient of the 
unskilled workers by differentiating and rearran;_;ing equation (9'). 
"* * "* (10) + 1 ¢ + (Cn w 
* where ~n = .2..h/L; <j)n = R, *L*/L; ¢ a C X/L • 
X r 
The first part of the expression is easily understood: the population 
h will be higher in regions with larger land masses and in regions where 
workers each demand relatively little land•. The last two terms depend on 
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relative prices and elasticities of substitution. These expressions are 
not central to our main purpose here and so their discussion is confined 
to the Appendix. 
The most interesting issue for our purpose is the relative population 
"* 
gradient or, h - h • This can be found by rearranging equation (8): 
,. ,. ..."* '"'* * '"'* * (11) h ""* - h = C ) = e L(; - w ) 0 + (r w ) 0(Cw WWw r wr 
... ...*: * + (w - r) 0 + n (n - nw)wrj w 
c .. 
where 0 .. = -2:.L 
1J c.c. 
1 J 
The hif,her the wage of the skilled relative to the unskilled, the lower 
will be the population of the skilled relative to the unskilled. Sil!lilarly• 
the higher the wage deflated by rental payments• the lower the relative 
population of that type of worker. All of these effects are stronger, the 
larger the partial elasticities of substitution in production. If no 
substitution in production were possible, then relative prices would be 
irrelevant to the distribution of workers. 
The final term describes the direct effect of the environment on 
production. If n enhances the productivity of h, less h is necessary to 
produce a unit of output at constant factor prices; this fact is expressed 
by nw < 0 Thus, nw * - ~ > 0 means that n increases the productivity 
of h by more than that of h*, and the population of h falls relative to 
* that of h. The reason for this seemingly paradoxical result is that 
this productivity effect is a direct demand side effect holding constant 
factor prices. If factor requirements fall• then demand for that particular 
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factor falls as well. 
The full effect of n on the population gradient includes the 
direct effect on productivity just discussed and the effect of n on the 
relative prices as well. Recall from equation (5) that the relative 
wage of the unskilled are likely to rise, the stronger their taste for 
land compared to the skilled and the weaker their tastes for the amenity 
aspect of n compared to the skilled. The rent deflated wage of each type 
depends only upon whether n is amenable and whether n is productive. If 
A A* A A 
n is both amenable and productive, then r - w > 0 and w - r < O, anrl 
"* 
the net effect on h - h is ambiguous. 
III. Conclusion 
What is the iraplication of all of this analysis for policy making? 
Stated sim?lY, it is this: Regional wage differences and complex population 
movenents are not sufficient reason for policy makers to discourage migration. 
The distrihution of populations across a country is governed by a complicated 
set of interactin3 causes. What appears to be an inexplicable confusion 
of peoples migrating to and fro, may in fact be the perfectly natural 
result of reasonnble economic betavior. 
The T!lodel presented in this paper focused on the effects of climate 
on tt1e relative distribution of two types of people. The results were 
intuitive and understandable, but ambiguous because of the offsetting 
forces. In the real world, location decisionsinteractions of several economic 
are influenced by many factors not included in this simple model. The 
living patterns will be that much more unpredictable in the real situations 
faced by policy makers. But the fact that observers can not immediately explain 
why people migrate as they do, does not demonstrate that the migration is 
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not the result of real economic forces. Differences in tastes for clinate 
alone can produce a complex distribution of populations. 
. -15-
FOOTNOTES 
1The imolicit land and capital ownership assumption is that each 
worker 0"7ns an equal share of land and of firms in all locations. This 
allows us to ignore capital gains from land ownership. Also, unearned 
incorae is independent of location, and so does not appear in the maximization 
problem. 
2
People are assuned mobile enough to choose a permanent location 
but not mohile enough to work in one region and live in another. 
3The reader may be surprised to notice that the relative wage of the 
two types of labor does not depend on the relative effect of non the 
productivity of each factor. The reason for this is that an increase 
in the productivity of one factor decreases the total costs of production. 
Decreased costs allows higher prices to be paid to any and all of the 
factors. The model does not posses enough structure to assign the factor 
specific productivity increases to particular factors of production. 
Introducing a second type of output and dropping the requirement that 
all factors are required in the production of each of the goods would 
illuminate this interesting additional assignment problem. 
4Readers familiar with the problems of LDC's may balk at 
my use of a lab~r market clearin~ condition. If the labor market does not 
clear lu some areas, then au addlLional wage prerlium must be paid in those 
areas. (See Todaro.) The type of results for population distribution 




n ) • k
2 
r· n ) • k1' 
w 
Figure 1 
